Aristotle on Perfect Friendship by Taylor, Craig Duncan
ARISTOTLE ON PERFECT FRIENDSHIP
89
Aristotle on Perfect Friendship
Craig Taylor
In ths paper I argue that Arstotle’s concepton of deal or perfect frendshp, frend-
shp whch s based on the love people of good character mght have for each other qua 
good, s so moralsed as to fal to capture our common understandng of the nature 
and mportance of frendshp. In partcular, I argue that frendshp tself ndcates an 
mportant human good, but crucally a good that cannot, contrary to what Arstotle 
suggests, be wholly accommodated wthn our concepton of the morally good lfe for 
human bengs: Our attachment to our closest frends has a value that cannot necessar-
ly be reconcled wth our attempts to lve a morally good lfe. 
What s unproblematc s that Arstotle saw frendshp as an essental element of the 
good or moral lfe for human bengs — at least on that concepton of the good lfe 
that Arstotle develops n the first nne books of the Nicomachean Ethics.1 I wll not 
examne or even comment on the tensons between that vew (and hence the place of 
frendshp n the good lfe) and what Arstotle goes on to say about the place of con-
templaton n the good lfe n book X of the NE. What does concern me n ths paper 
s the suggeston — also obvous to many — that Arstotle’s account of frendshp, and 
specfically what he calls perfect frendshp, makes that relatonshp not just mpor-
tant to the human good but so hgh mnded — we mght even say moralsed — as to 
seem very counterntutve. But n order to see the problem here we need an account 
of what Arstotle means by frendshp.
Frst of all, frendshp s a much broader class of relatonshps than what we would 
term that way. So, Arstotle would nclude under frendshp not just close ntmate 
relatonshps between people unrelated, but also famly relatonshps (ncludng t 
would seem those between husband and wfe) and the relatonshps we make wth 
(some) busness or work companons that we mght not naturally thnk of as frend-
shp relatons. Nevertheless, as Cooper2 notes, Arstotle’s concepton of frendshp 
1 Hereafter NE. All quotatons are from the W. D. Ross translaton as edted by J. O. Urmson n Barnes, 
1984. I have followed the usual conventon n referrng to passages of Arstotle, whch s to refer to the 
page numbers and column letters of the standard edton of the works of Arstotle edted by Bekker. 
These page numbers and column letters are repeated n all modern edtons of Arstotle’s works.
2 Cooper, 1980.
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s not so broad as to nclude any knd of mutual attracton between people. Rather, 
frendshp for Arstotle at least requres that both partes develop (through actually 
dong thngs together) actve tes to one another. Indeed, t s through an account of 
the nature of these tes that Arstotle charactersed what he takes to be the three basc 
knds of frendshp: utlty, pleasure and vrtue (or character) frendshps.
Arstotle tells us then that there are bascally three thngs that are lovable and these 
are the good, the pleasant and the useful. These three thngs provde the grounds on 
whch people love one another and consequently form frendshps. Correspondng to 
these grounds we obtan three knds of frendshp where n each knd “those who love 
each other wsh well to each other n that respect n whch they love one another” (NE 
1156a:8). Now of the three types of frendshps only one, vrtue or character frend-
shp, whch s based on the love people of good character mght have for each other 
qua good, s deal or perfect, whle the other two “are only ncdental; for t s not 
as beng the man he s that he s loved but as provdng some good or pleasure” (NE 
1156a:17). So t seems that where we are loved as provdng some good or pleasure, 
our frend wll wsh us well only n so far as we are (or reman) useful or pleasant to 
that person. Now t may be thought that ths n tself s enough to show that Arstotle’s 
account of frendshp s overly moralsed, placng as t does the perfect or deal form 
of frendshp beyond the reach of most of us who are less than completely vrtuous. 
For the rest of us, t would seem, our relatonshps wth others wll be doomed to be 
merely nstrumental. We wll never be cared for by others for our own sake, but only 
to the extent that we are useful or pleasant. But we need not nterpret Arstotle that 
way (and as suggested n the above translaton). Cooper, for example, has argued that 
whle Arstotle holds that n the case of utlty or pleasure frendshps we wsh another 
well because they are useful or pleasant, t does not follow that we do not wsh such 
people well for ther own sake. As Cooper says the mportant queston here s “what 
does Arstotle mean by ths because?”.3 Accordng to Cooper we need to understand 
ths “because” causally: I come to wsh well to my useful frend because he s useful 
to be wth but that doesn’t mean that I only wsh hm well n order that I may be able 
to contnue benefitng from hm. Rather, n such cases a person “wshes well for hs 
frend’s own sake, n consequence of recognsng hm as someone who regularly ben-
efits hm and has done so n the past”.4 On ths nterpretaton even though we are not 
vrtuous we may stll wsh another well for ther own sake. It s just that the grounds 
of frendshp are somewhat truncated n these mperfect knds of frendshp because 
pleasantness or usefulness are not essental to whom we are; they depend upon con-
tngency and good fortune whch may easly change. Whle, of course, vrtue or good 
character go to the essence of whom we are; they go to our lvng the lfe proper to 
bengs such as ourselves.
3 Cooper, 1980:309.
4 Cooper, 1980:311.
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Stll, there s another sense n whch Arstotle’s concepton of frendshp may seem to 
be counter ntutve and even overly moralsed. For even grantng Cooper’s pont that 
n all three types of frendshp we may wsh a frend well for ther own sake, t remans 
true of Arstotle’s account of frendshp that n any frendshp we, as one mght say, 
always retan an eye on our own good or, perhaps wth character frendshp, on the 
good. So even though frendshps of the lesser knd are not purely nstrumental, all 
three knds of frendshp reman condtonal on the presence of certan valuable qual-
tes n our frends. Ths becomes clear when Arstotle consders the condtons under 
whch we may break off a frendshp: 
Another queston that arses s whether frendshps should or should not be broken off 
when the other party does not reman the same. Perhaps we may say that there s noth-
ng strange n breakng off a frendshp based on utlty or pleasure, when our frends no 
longer have these attrbutes. For t was of these attrbutes that we were the frends; and 
when these have faled t s reasonable to love no longer (NE 1165b:1–4).
So as Cooper says n the case of a busnessman’s utlty frendshp wth a customer, 
“[s]o long as the general context of profitablty remans, the well-wshng can pro-
ceed unchecked”.5 Presumably though, should ths context change so that the cus-
tomer s no longer a source of profit, then the frendshp wll end. But now I thnk 
that we, or perhaps many of us, would take t as a definng feature of a frendshp even 
n such a context that the well-wshng (the frendshp) should survve beyond the 
financal exchange. That, I thnk many would say, shows that ths was n fact a real 
frendshp (however we may wsh to construe frendshp). Ths s not to deny that 
such frendshps may arse out of some mutually benefical exchange but to say that 
such exchanges do not entrely determne even such frendshps. But for Arstotle 
the qualtes of another for whch we love them (utlty, pleasure or goodness) are 
the entre bass of the relevant frendshps, should these qualtes be removed “t s 
reasonable to love no longer”. 
Let me stress that I am not now suggestng that t s unreasonable n such stuatons 
to love no more, but merely that as a matter of fact ths s not what always happens. 
There s, I wll suggest, somethng else n vrtue of whch frendshps may survve the 
knd of change that Arstotle envsages, and ths ndcates a feature of frendshp that 
Arstotle ether dd not consder or dsmssed. The element of frendshp that I have 
n mnd here may be charactersed as smply a life shared. So, we value our frends 
not only because we recognse n them somethng useful, pleasant or even good, but 
because our lves and our experences are ntertwned. It s not then sufficent to char-
acterse frendshp merely to say that frends wsh each other well for ther own sake 
out of recognton of certan qualtes they possess, for what s also true s that we are 
attached to our frends. By “attachment” here I mean that there s a bond between 
frends the severng of whch n tself wll come at a certan cost qute ndependently 
of any loss of anythng benefical, pleasant or good. 
5 Cooper, 1980:314.
Taylor, Craig. 2009. Aristotle on Perfect Friendship. In E. Close, G. Couvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, and M. Tsianikas (eds.) "Greek 
Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2007", Flinders 
University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 89-96.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
CRAIG TAYLOR
92
Of course, Arstotle was aware n a sense of the mportance of tme spent together 
for frendshps — at least n the case of the best knd of frendshp. As he says:
[S]uch frendshps requre tme and famlarty; as the proverb says, men cannot know 
each other tll they have “eaten salt together”; nor can they admt each other to frend-
shp or be frends tll each has been found lovable and been trusted by each (NE 1156:
b26–30).
Though even here t seems tme spent wth another s smply mportant for recogns-
ng a (potental) frend’s goodness and not smply as tme, and a lfe, shared. What 
s more ths also mples somewhat counterntutvely that all ths tme “eatng salt 
together” was not tme spent wth a frend, not at least untl the other was recognsed 
as good and hence a possble character frend. 
Ths n fact brngs out an aspect of frendshp for us that I thnk Arstotle would 
have to deny: that for us frends are not necessarly or always conscously chosen. Ths 
seems true of all three types of frendshp as Arstotle descrbes them. So magne our 
busnessman decdng to qut hs busness. He may dscover after a tme that he msses 
certan of hs customers. The general context of profitablty has gone, stll he may say 
“I really mss Fred”. Indeed ths may be the first tme he s conscous that Fred was more 
than just another customer. Hs sense of loss (of attachment that s, or may be about to 
be, severed) may reveal that they have shared somethng more than busness. 
Perhaps though thngs wll be dfferent n the case of character frends — those 
whom are most properly called frends — for what they share s vrtuous actvty; that 
s, they share more than busness or pleasure (or some combnaton thereof), they 
share a dstnctve knd of lfe. In fact n the example above of the busnessman and 
hs customer we mght say that smply because these two share somethng more than 
busness ther frendshp must be somethng more than a utlty-frendshp, that t 
has become somethng akn to a character-frendshp. What character-frends share 
of course s not just a lmted range of actvtes determned by some specfic context 
of profitablty or pleasure but the whole range of actvtes that characterse the lfe 
of vrtue. One argument Arstotle n fact gves for clamng that frendshp s partally 
consttutve of the good or flourshng human lfe s then as follows:
Further, men thnk that the happy man ought to lve pleasantly. Now f he were soltary, 
lfe would be hard for hm; for by oneself t s not easy to be contnuously actve; but wth 
others and towards others t s easer. Wth others therefore hs actvty wll be more con-
tnuous, beng n tself pleasant, as t ought to be for the man who s blessed; for a good 
man qua good delghts n excellent actons and s vexed by vcous ones, as a muscal man 
enjoys beautful tunes but s paned at bad ones (NE 1170a:4–10). 
We mght ask, though, why contnuous actvty s easer when shared wth others? 
Whle Arstotle does not (to my knowledge at least) say, a number of thngs may 
suggest themselves. Cooper suggests three possble reasons for thnkng that actv-
tes shared wth others may be more contnuous. Frst they provde an “mmedate 
Taylor, Craig. 2009. Aristotle on Perfect Friendship. In E. Close, G. Couvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, and M. Tsianikas (eds.) "Greek 
Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2007", Flinders 
University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 89-96.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
ARISTOTLE ON PERFECT FRIENDSHIP
93
and contnuous sense that what one finds nterestng and worthwhle s so”. Second, 
that actvtes shared “enhance one’s attachment to and nterest n one’s own personal 
actvtes by puttng them wthn the context of a broader group actvty”. Thrd, that 
shared actvtes “expand the scope of one’s actvty” by enablng one to share ndrectly 
n the actvtes of other members of the group.6 And now we may say that the reason 
why t s so mportant to share actvtes specfically wth character-frends s that t s 
only n the case of ntmate relatonshps wth such people that we can be confident 
that another shares wth us (f we are vrtuous) the character for, and commtment to, 
the knd of vrtuous actvty that we want to engage n more contnuously.
Once agan, however, what seems at bottom to matter here s not essentally that 
we share actvtes and a lfe wth another, but that we are able to lve more completely 
a certan knd of lfe, the lfe of moral and ntellectual vrtue. Agan, ths may seem 
to us a hghly moralsed account of the value of frendshp. For t makes the actv-
tes that frends share mportant only n so far as they have a specfic pont (to make 
vrtuous actvty more contnuous). But ths does not seem to capture the value that 
sharng a lfe can have n and of tself, ndependently of the content of the lfe we are 
thereby sharng. To llustrate the pont here, consder an ordnary knd of example. I 
spend hours wth my frend Ian n the pub engaged n what may seem from the out-
sde a somewhat pontless actvty, ndeed the actvty may even be causng me long 
term harm. But I may stll value ths tme spent together wth my frend even though 
nothng, or at least nothng external to ths relatonshp, comes of t.
It s possble of course to argue that even n the knd of context just envsaged 
frends are pursung together ther own concepton of the human good. Perhaps the 
conversaton s not so pontless; perhaps such conversatons can be construed as a 
knd of vrtuous actvty, perhaps nvolvng the exercse and development of certan 
capactes for nsght and reflecton nto one’s own lfe and human nature. Of course, 
from nsde ths relatonshp the conversaton and tme spent together s not pont-
less; t matters qute a lot to me that I am able to spend ths tme wth my frend Ian. 
What I do not, or may not, have however s a concepton of ths actvty as valuable 
ndependently of the value I place on ths relatonshp or my attachment to Ian. And 
even on the most chartable nterpretaton of Arstotle t must surely reman true that 
for hm such frends wll have, as I have sad, an eye on the good that seems to my 
mnd at least ncompatble wth the knd of morally uncrtcal nvolvement wth (at 
least) one’s closest frends. 
Perhaps, though, t should not be so surprsng that ths knd of morally uncrtcal 
nvolvement wth another should not have figured n Arstotle’s account of frendshp; 
he s after all n the NE concerned wth the way n whch frendshp contrbutes to 
the human good. In the context of such an account t of course seems necessary that 
frendshp should be entrely subject to Arstotle’s concepton of the human good. And 
of course the thought I have just ntroduced ponts to the dangers that certan close 
6 Cooper, 1980:328–9.
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7 Cockng and Kennett, 2000. In ths paper Cockng and Kennett defend the followng two clams, 
“frst, that n some cases where we are led morally astray by vrtue of a relatonshp that makes ts own 
clams on us, the relatonshp n queston s properly called frendshp; second, that relatonshps of 
ths knd are valuable n ther own rght” (p. 297).
frendshps may brng for our attempts to acheve that good. For f one may n the con-
text of frendshp lose sght, through one’s nvolvement wth and attachment to one’s 
closest frends, of the lfe of moral and ntellectual vrtue, then t may be that frendshp 
tself may pose, as Cockng and Kennett have argued,7 a knd of moral danger to us. 
Consder then the possblty of a frend, whom was good but has gone bad. What 
are we to do about ths stuaton should we find ourselves n t? Well, here s Arstotle’s 
vew on the matter:
But f one accepts another man as good, and he becomes bad and s seen to do so, must 
one stll love hm? Surely t s not possble, snce not everythng can be loved, but only 
what s good. ... Must the frendshp, then, be forthwth broken off? Or s t not so n all 
cases, but only when one’s frends are ncurable n ther wckedness? If they are capable 
of beng reformed one should rather come to the assstance of ther character or ther 
property, nasmuch as ths s better and more characterstc of frendshp. But a man who 
breaks off such a frendshp would seem to be dong nothng strange; for t was not a man 
of ths sort that he was a frend; when hs frend has changed, therefore, and he s unable 
to save hm, he gves hm up (NE 1165b:13–23).
In one way, all ths sounds perfectly reasonable: we do sometmes have to gve up our 
frends when they have changed out of all recognton. Stll, there seems to be a tellng 
reluctance even on Arstotle’s part to accept hs own concluson. Now here one mght 
smply want to say that where we cannot gve up a frend fallen nto wckedness we are 
smply beng rratonal and that we are even turnng our back on not just our good but 
the good. Now f the human good just s (s exhausted by) somethng lke the lfe of 
moral and ntellectual vrtue, then ths would ndeed be rratonal. However, t may be 
argued that frendshp tself ndcates an mportant human good, but crucally a good 
that cannot be wholly accommodated wthn our concepton of the morally good lfe 
for human bengs. And ndeed ths s what I have been suggestng: our attachment to 
our closest frends has a value that cannot necessarly be reconcled wth our attempts 
to lve a morally good lfe. 
The ssue just rased about the relatonshp between frendshp and moralty s, 
t must be conceded, a large and contentous one. So there are, for nstance, con-
temporary thnkers who would defend what I am callng here the knd of moralsed 
concepton of frendshp that we see n Arstotle. But f we are prepared to accept that 
frendshp s an mportant human value that may conflct wth our attempt to lve the 
moral lfe then t wll not be smply rratonal to turn our back on the good rather than 
turnng our back on a frend. Indeed t may be argued that ths choce s n the end the 
more plausbly human choce to make; a choce that acknowledges the place attach-
ment to others plays n a recognsably human lfe. On ths pont consder Orwell’s 
thoughts on Gandh that Cockng and Kennett refer to: 
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Close frendshps, Gandh says, are dangerous, because “frends react to one another” 
and through loyalty to a frend one can be led nto wrong-dong. Ths s unqueston-
ably true. ... The essence of beng human s that one does not seek perfecton, that one is 
sometmes wllng to commt sns for the sake of loyalty, ... that one s prepared n the end 
to be defeated and broken up by lfe, whch s the nevtable prce of fastenng one’s love 
upon other human ndvduals.8
I have suggested that whle frendshp may not always be compatble wth our attempt 
to lve the moral lfe, t may nvolve an mportant and ndependently dentfiable 
human value. The passage just quoted hnts at what that value mght be. For the 
value of loyalty s not lmted or exhausted by ts relaton to furtherng the moral lfe, 
however we may conceve of that. Of course ths opens up the possblty that the 
demands of loyalty may conflct wth the demands of the moral lfe. But n order to 
understand that conflct we need to understand the specfic value or sgnficance of 
loyalty to one’s friends.9 
A further feature of frendshp, and one the also poses problems for Arstotle, s 
that here our love s drected, or as Orwell says “fastened”, on partcular unque nd-
vduals. It s then to these unque ndvduals that we recognse loyalty. So t does not 
really capture the nature or mportance of ths loyalty to say as Arstotle does n jus-
tfyng our gvng up a frend turned to wckedness that “t was not a man of ths sort 
that he was a frend”. For t was not merely as a person of any gven sort that one was 
a frend but a unque ndvdual human beng: Fred, or John or Nancy. The demand 
of loyalty we feel towards our closest frends cannot smply be renounced or slenced 
by the fact that such a frend s no longer the sort of person he or she was or that ther 
lfe s no longer drected towards the pursut of the good. Indeed, loyalty to a frend 
means nothng, s nothng, f t cannot contnue to hold us when other reasons we 
mght have for stckng to our frends, ncludng the pursut of utlty pleasure or even 
the good, have faled. Ths s not to say that loyalty requres us to stck to our frends 
no matter what. It may be that a frend has become so wcked that the bond of loyalty 
must be breached. But what s true, I thnk, s that even n such cases where we do find 
t necessary to gve up a frend, our deserton s stll a knd of falure, more precsely, 
even n such a case we may reasonably feel that we have faled them. 
To llustrate the above pont, consder the film, The Third Man; specfically, con-
sder the central relatonshps between Harry Lme and hs frend Holly Martns and 
hs lover Anna. Harry, who had asked Holly to Venna, has had to fake hs own death 
before Holly arrves to prevent beng caught by the nternatonal polce for hs n-
volvement n stolen penclln racket. The racket nvolvng watered down penclln 
has caused terrble sufferng and death to many people — ncludng many chldren. 
Both Holly and Anna are brought to see the true nature of ther frend and lover but 
8 Orwell, 1949:495.
9 Of course, there are other knds of loyalty ncludng loyalty to country, to a specfic socal/poltcal 
cause, or even to one’s professon.
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ther responses to Harry’s mmoralty are mportantly dfferent. Whle they both, de-
spte Harry’s callous ndfference to the sufferng he has caused, retan a love for and 
loyalty to Harry, Holly s prepared n the end to gve up hs frend, specfically to betray 
hm to the polce, whle Anna remans loyal to Harry and refuses to be mplcated n 
Holly’s act of betrayal. Now Harry s truly a very bad man, and we can well understand 
Holly’s decson here. But equally I thnk, and ths s my pont, we can understand An-
na’s contnued loyalty to Harry. Holly, we may say, has done the rght thng, but stll he 
has betrayed a frend. And Anna’s final contempt for Holly n the wonderful last scene 
of the move where she walks past Holly on her way from Harry’s (real) grave wthout 
even acknowledgng hm records the fact that betrayal of a frend even here can be 
deeply, and properly, shamng. Here the dstnct and genune clams of loyalty and 
the moral lfe (at least as we would understand t) cannot be reconcled. That we can 
understand Anna’s contempt for Holly, that we can recognse ths as a reasonable or 
approprate response to Holly’s act of betrayal, shows that loyalty has a value or sgnfi-
cance that cannot always be accommodated wthn our concepton of the moral lfe. 
The account of frendshp that I have sketched — and specfically of the knd of 
value that s nternal to t — s obvously contentous. The mportant queston though 
s not whether some frendshps are mmoral but whether they are truly frendshps. 
If one could be a frend, a frend moreover of the best knd, to Harry Lme to the very 
end, then Arstotle’s account of frendshp must be flawed. For such a frendshp must 
be ncompatble wth the connecton Arstotle nssts upon between frendshp and 
hs concepton of human good. 
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